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THE INHERENT POWER AND DUE
PROCESS MODELS IN CONFLICT:
SANCTIONS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
by
Neil H. Cogan*
They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.'
We do not sit as a means by which the system can be punished-or to
be punished ourselves-by the pursuit of frivolous or malicious appeals
by disgruntled state prisoners. 2
HE topic of sanctions, particularly sanctions under rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has been in recent years a "hot
topic" of process. Many dozens of articles, essays, comments, and
notes have discussed the issues presented by the recent enhancement of sanc-
tions under rule 11. There are discussions of whether the rule makes process
more or less speedy and costly; whether the rule encourages or discourages
lawsuits or motion practice; whether the rule favors plaintiffs or defendants.
And, of course, the literature has explored whether the rule discourages
what has been perceived as unreasonable conduct by parties and attorneys.
Such conduct, if allowed, makes the litigation process unfair and causes un-
just results.
In this essay, I take a different look at sanctions, one that can be taken
with any rule of process or, for that matter, any rule of conduct. I look at
the sources of law from which one court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, during the last three years has drawn its decisions on sanctions,
under rule 11 and other rules and statutes. In effect, I look at the issue of
legitimacy, whether the substance and method of the court of appeals' impo-
sition of monetary and dignitary penalties has been legitimate. Whether a
court acts legitimately in seeking to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive
results is itself an important issue of justice, as well as structure.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity School of Law.
This paper was read at the 45th Annual Judicial Conference, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
on April 18, 1988, at Jackson, Mississippi. The author thanks the court and Judges E. Grady
Jolly, Alvin B. Rubin, and Patrick E. Higginbotham for the gracious invitation to address the
Conference and the warm hospitality shown him during his attendance. He thanks Ms. Rina
Geisler, Assistant Director of the Staff Attorney's Office, for kindly supplying the unpublished
opinions of the court.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
2. Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
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In part I, I describe three models that courts have followed in deciding
process issues. In part II, I argue that the court of appeals has split as to
which model to follow, although in deciding several important issues re-
cently, the court has opted for the model that gives it greatest control over
access to the courts. In part III, I make some suggestions for the future
decision-making by the Fifth Circuit and other courts.
I. THREE MODELS
Courts follow at least three models in finding sources for their decision of
issues connected with process. Not every court follows but one model; cer-
tainly large appellate courts do not. These models instead describe points
along a continuum. A court's process decisions over a few years can show
where along the continuum the court, or a majority of judges on an appellate
court, finds its model.
The continuum in the process area, similar to its analogue in the substance
area, charts a court's sources for, and its uses of, judicial power. At one end
of the continuum is the formalist model. A federal court that follows this
model finds its power primarily in the text of statutes and rules and seconda-
rily in the text of article III. This court looks to legislative history and advi-
sory committee notes in order to read text. A formalist court would claim
that its sources of power have greater legitimacy than those of any other
court because its sources of power are legitimated by legislature or
conventions.
The formalist court opens or restricts litigants' access to court according
to the provisions of text. This court is, usually, the least activist court, but
assuming that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by text and intention,
were designed to open access to litigants, the formalist court also opens
access.
A little farther along the continuum is the due process model. The court
that follows this model is influenced but not captured by the due process
clauses of the Constitution. In addition to other sources, this court finds
power in the principles and policies of due process, those principles and poli-
cies connected primarily with fair notice, a fair hearing, known legal stan-
dards, a written articulated decision by a trial court, and full appellate
review.
The due process court claims legitimacy for its use of due process princi-
ples and policies by reference not simply to the federal and state constitu-
tions, but to traditions of fairness developed and accepted at law and
especially in equity. This court opens litigant access to courts more than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure textually require. This court often is
activist.
Farther along the continuum are a number of weak inherent power mod-
els, with a strong inherent power model at the very end of the continuum.
Some courts that follow a weak inherent power model find power in their
special role in the constitutional system; for example, in a special role to
protect civil rights. These courts look for legitimacy to the Reconstruction
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amendments and jurisdictional statutes, as well as civil rights legislation en-
acted during and since Reconstruction. These courts are especially sympa-
thetic to access by civil rights plaintiffs. They are still more activist.
Some courts find both power and limitation of power in the principles of
separation of powers and federalism. They find legitimacy for these princi-
ples not so much in the text of the Constitution as in its structure and rela-
tionships, as well as in some jurisdictional statutes. These courts are
generally unsympathetic to access, but they too are more activist than the
formalist and due process courts.
Finally, at the end of the continuum are the courts that find power inher-
ent in their institution, in the power of courts qua courts. The sources are
not textual, but are instead historical and political. These courts follow a
strong inherent power model.
The inherent power models, especially those at the end of the continuum,
are the most boundless. The courts that follow them have the widest range
of sources and the widest freedom of choice in using these sources. These
courts are the most activist in the process area. They might, for example,
emphasize the right of persons to have access to the federal courts for the
vindication of federal rights. Or they might emphasize the shrinking re-
sources of the federal courts, the need for the federal courts to be selective in
the disputes they decide, or simply their unhappiness with certain kinds of
litigation. In deciding several important issues in the last three years, a ma-
jority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed a strong inherent
power model, using inherent power to restrict access to both the district
courts and to the court of appeals itself.
II. SANCTIONS
The Fifth Circuit's decisions about sanctions can be divided into two
parts: sanctions imposed initially by a district court and sanctions imposed
initially by the court of appeals itself.
A. Sanctions Imposed by the District Court
The court of appeals' decisions about sanctions imposed by district courts
have come under at least eight headings. Sections 1447(c), 1915(e), and
1927 of title 28; section 1988 of title 42; rules 11, 37, and 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and (quite explicitly) the inherent power of the
courts. Under each heading, a careful reading of the decisions shows a cqn-
flict between a due process model and a strong inherent power model.
One example is the conflict between panels in Batson v. Neal Spelce Associ-
ates, Inc. 3 In Batson I the court, per Judge Jolly, followed a due process
model in reversing and remanding a judgment of a district court. The dis-
trict court had under rule 37 both dismissed a case and awarded over
$30,000 in fees and costs as sanctions for a failure to disclose. 4 In reviewing
3. 765 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1985); 805 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1986).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) ("[T]he court ... may make such orders in regard to the
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the district court's order, the court of appeals panel said that the sanction of
dismissal could be imposed first, only if the discovery failure is willful or in
bad faith; second, only if deterrence cannot be achieved by a less drastic
sanction; and third, only if the aggrieved party's trial preparation is substan-
tially prejudiced. The court added as a fourth consideration that the sanc-
tion of dismissal may be inappropriate where the failure is the attorney's and
not the client's or where the failure was grounded in confusion or sincere
misunderstanding. 5 In Batson I the court vacated the sanction of dismissal
because the district court did not make "explicit findings" on the possibility
of less drastic sanctions. 6
The court said also that the sanction of fees and costs must take into ac-
count only those actually caused by the discovery failure and that such a
sanction must be reasonable. 7 The court reversed the award of $30,000 be-
cause that sum was not the expense caused by the discovery failure and be-
cause the amount "appear[ed] to be unreasonable on its face."18 The court
rejected arguments that the award could be sustained under section 1988, 9
section 1927,10 and under the inherent power of the courts. I
On remand, the district court found that only dismissal served the deter-
rent purpose of rule 37; further, it found that the plaintiff had acted in bad
faith not simply regarding the discovery failure, but regarding the whole
conduct of the litigation. 12 The district court, therefore, reaffirmed its sanc-
tion of dismissal and its award of $30,000.13
In Batson 1114 a second panel of the Fifth Circuit, per Judge Johnson,
affirmed both sanctions. Regarding dismissal, the court held, with no expli-
cation, that the district court's finding that dismissal was the only deterrent
was not clearly erroneous and the judgment of dismissal was, therefore, not
failure [to comply with a discovery order] as are just, and among others the following: ...
dismissing the action .... In lieu of any [other sanctions] or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party . . . or the attorney . . . to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees ....").
5. 765 F.2d at 514.
6. Id. at 516. The court did not find the dismissal sanction erroneous, but instead said it
could not determine whether dismissal was appropriate without greater articulation by the
district court. Since a remand was necessary on the sanction of fees and costs, the court also
remanded the dismissal issue in the interest of "judicial economy." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a [civil rights] provi-
sion ... ,the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party.., a reasonable attorney's
fee"). The court held that the district court's opinion did not support the award. 765 F.2d at
517.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) ("Any attorney ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."). The court
said a sanction under section 1927 would have to be against the offending party's attorney,
while the sanction in this case was against the party. 765 F.2d at 516 n.3.
It. 765 F.2d at 516-17 n.3.
12. Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 632, 637-44 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
13. See 112 F.R.D. 632 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
14. 805 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1986).
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an abuse of discretion. 15 Regarding the fees and costs, the court in Batson II
held that the district court had power under judge-made rules, independent
of rule 37, to impose an award of $30,000 for the plaintiff's bad faith litiga-
tion. 16 The second panel rejected an argument that, in order to support the
award of $30,000, the district court was required to hold a hearing on the
merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim.' 7
What happened between Batson I and Batson II was a switch from a due
process model to a strong inherent power model, from a model concerned
with the text of rule 37 as tempered by notions of fairness to a model content
with the court's inherent power and eager for docket control against seem-
ingly abusive litigants. The first panel favored traditional due process princi-
ples, namely, a hearing, written articulated findings, adherence to known
legal standards, and full appellate review. The second panel favored district
court discretion (read, "inherent power"), 18 including discretion whether to
hold a hearing and discretion whether to sanction. Further, the second
panel favored both district court and appellate court discretion by opting for
reversal only if findings of fact are clearly erroneous and only if applications
of law to fact amount to an abuse of discretion. These standards of review
not only reject a due process model in favor of a strong inherent power
model and not only dissuade the kinds of litigants the second panel found
abusive. These standards of review also give no notice to the profession as to
what the court of appeals truly deems to be sanctionable conduct.
A second conflict of models arose not between panels of the court of ap-
peals but within a single panel. The conflict appeared in two cases decided
within a week of each other, Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff
Abner 19 and News-Texan, Inc. v. Garland.20 In Brinkmann, the issue of
sanctions arose from a dismissal of a suit under rule 37. The court, per
Judge Garwood, reaffirmed the due process factors described by Judge Jolly
in Batson 1.21 Moreover, Judge Garwood added to those four factors22 a
fifth, that in order to impose the sanction of dismissal a district court must
make a clear record of litigant delay or "contumacious conduct. '' 23 In con-
trast with Batson 11, the Brinkmann court said that its review of a district
court dismissal "must be 'particularly scrupulous.' "24 In reviewing the dis-
missal in Brinkmann at some length, the court tellingly noted that the plain-
tiff had received notice that continuing his discovery failure "would result in
dismissal."'25
By contrast, in News-Texan, the same panel of the court of appeals fol-
15. Id. at 551.
16. Id. at 550-51.
17. Id. at 551.
18. Id.
19. 813 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1987).
20. 814 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1987).
21. 765 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1985).
22. See supra text accompanying note 5.
23. 813 F.2d at 749.
24. Id. (quoting Emerick v. Fenick Indus., Inc., 539 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1976)).
25. Id. at 750 (emphasis in original).
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lowed an inherent power model where the issue of sanctions arose not under
rule 37 but under rule 1126 and under section 1447(c) 27 of the removal provi-
sions. The district court had held that the removal of a case from state to
federal court by the city of Garland, Texas, was improvident. 28 The district
court had declined to award costs, however, because it did not find that the
city of Garland had acted in "bad faith."'29 The court of appeals, again per
Judge Garwood, held that neither rule 11 nor section 1447(c) textually re-
quires "bad faith,"' 30 and impliedly refused to do what it did under rule 37 in
Brinkmann, namely, read the text in light of due process principles and
policies.
While the city of Garland maintained that it had filed its removal petition
on a theory of law that was at the "frontier of the law,"' 3 1 the court of ap-
peals said that Garland's frontier was a "far frontier,"' 32 unwarranted by an
objective view of existing law or a good faith extension thereof. The court
made no mention of such due process factors as notice, confusion, misunder-
standing, or contumaciousness, although it hinted that there was prejudice
as a result of the delay caused by removal. The absence of such factors is
troublesome, of course, because not just costs but attorney's fees are avail-
able under rule 11. 33
It might be argued that the distinction between Brinkmann and News-
Texan is a distinction between the sanction of dismissal and the sanction of
costs and fees. When the sanction includes attorney's fees that may quickly
reach tens of thousands of dollars, however, the distinction breaks down.
Tens of thousands of dollars in many cases overwhelms the amount at stake
in a plaintiff's case and becomes in effect a dismissal. Moreover, the mere
possibility of such an award is so onerous for some plaintiffs that it becomes
the potential case's death-knell just as assuredly as is a dismissal of a filed
case.
A final example of district court sanctions is Thomas v. Capital Security
Services, Inc. 34 Thomas is a rule 11 case in which the court of appeals en
banc, per Judge Johnson, in part followed a due process model, but in im-
portant respects followed an inherent power model. To the observer, these
conflicting models in Thomas are a sign of compromise in writing the en
banc opinion.
In Thomas, the due process model is apparent in a holding that an attor-
ney's duties under rule 11 arise at fixed times rather than at all times; that is,
26. FED. R. Civ. P. I I ("[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction").
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) ("[i]f. . . it appears that the case was removed improvi-
dently and without jurisdiction, the district court ... may order the payment of just costs").
28. 814 F.2d at 217.
29. Id. at 220.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 217.
32. Id.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 ("sanction... may include.., expenses incurred ... including a
reasonable attorney's fee").
34. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
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the court held that it is fair to require a reasonable investigation when an
attorney signs a paper, but that it is not fair to require that an attorney
constantly re-evaluate his or her case with each new fact or decision brought
to the attorney's attention. 35 The due process model is apparent also in a
holding that it is incumbent upon an aggrieved party to notify an adversary
of a possible rule 11 violation at a time close to the offending conduct; it is
not fair to wait and run up exorbitant fees and costs. 36 A district court too is
required to notify a party that the court may impose rule 11 sanctions at the
end of the case. 37 The due process model is apparent in the court of appeals'
holding that a district court is required to impose the least drastic sanction
adequate to deter future violations. 38
The inherent power model is also apparent in important respects. The
court of appeals held that it would not require that district courts make
findings of fact and conclusions of law in each case of a violation; rather, it
held that the rigor of the district court's explication would depend upon "the
amount, type, and effect of the sanction applied."' 39 A due process model
would recognize that every sanction, even the least burdensome, affects the
reputation of a practitioner. Were due process the guide, a court would
make detailed findings and conclusions before a reputation could be tar-
nished. Absent compulsion by statute or rule, however, an inherent power
court considers that it has the inherent authority to ameliorate the burden
that would be imposed on a district court were it required in each case to
write a page or two of explication.
The inherent power model is apparent too in Thomas's overruling4° of
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co.41 In Robinson, the court held that a
district court's findings of fact to support a rule 11 sanction are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard; a district court's legal conclusion that
a particular set of facts constitutes a rule 11 violation is reviewed de novo;
and a district court's sanction, its amount and type, are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.42 Although the court's three-part holding was
in accord with traditional standards of review, the Thomas court held that
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and applications of law to fact would
each be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.43 Exercising its
inherent authority, the Thomas court believed that the traditional division of
responsibility imposed too much work upon the court of appeals itself.44
In addition to relieving district courts of work, these holdings also give
much discretion (read, "power") to the district courts. A district court that
need not explain its decisions in detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
35. Id. at 873-76.
36. Id. at 879-81.
37. Id. at 881.
38. Id. at 878.
39. Id. at 883.
40. Id. at 872.
41. 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 1126.
43. 836 F.2d at 871-73.
44. Id. at 883.
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law, and a district court that is reviewed under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard only, is powerful indeed. Furthermore, these holdings deter litigants
from bringing novel claims to district courts. Fewer lawsuits mean, of
course, less work for district courts and the court of appeals.
B. Sanctions Imposed by the Court of Appeals
The conflict between the due process and inherent power models is appar-
ent also in the sanctions imposed by the court of appeals under sections
191545 and 192746 of title 28 and rule 3847 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, especially the sanctions imposed upon pro se litigants.
In Gabel v. Lynaugh,48 a panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones said,
per curiam, that the court of appeals is concerned with the large number of
frivolous pro se appeals, especially by prisoners.49 According to Gabel, pris-
oners obtain complete or partial reversals in 7.62% of appeals, more than
half the rate of all appeals, 14.3%.50 With all due respect to the court,
7.62% is not a particularly poor reversal rate for litigants without counsel.
Nonetheless, the perception that prisoners bring a large number of frivolous
appeals is causing some conflict about how to sanction such appellants.
An appellate court following a due process model would, among other
concerns, be concerned with notice-notice to a litigant that an appeal or
other filing might be frivolous, notice that persistence may be sanctioned,
and notice that the sanction may be of a certain range and consequence. In
many cases, the court of appeals has indeed issued notices to pro se litigants
that future frivolous filings will subject them to sanctions. Some of these
have been lyrical, such as the warning to Tom Bush that he "has had his day
in court, and night has fallen," 5' and to Lavoyd "Bill" Hardin that "[t]he
appellate sponge is saturated."' 52 But it is far from clear, such lyrics notwith-
standing, that the court's notices have made litigants understand which of
their filings might be frivolous and what sanctions may follow.
In Lay v. Anderson, 53 for example, a panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and
Jones, per curiam, taxed costs on appeal of $105 against a pro se prisoner
under section 1915. 54 In so doing, the court emphasized that the prisoner
had "filed at least a half dozen petitions for habeas corpus relief and several
prisoner civil rights cases" 55 and that the merits of the current appeal were
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(d), (e) (1977) ("(d) The court ... may dismiss the case . . .if
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. (e) Judgment may be rendered for costs at
the conclusion of the suit or action ....").
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); see supra note 10.
47. FED. R. App. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous,
it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.").
48. 835 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 125 & n.1.
50. Id. at 125 n.l.
51. Bush v. United States, No. 87-6168, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 1988) (per curiam).
52. Hardin v. McMaster, No. 86-1914, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 1987) (per curiam).
53. 837 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).




frivolous. 56 The court added that it had "expressly warned [the litigant] that
his litigiousness must be controlled."'57 Indeed, the same panel had previ-
ously warned Mr. Lay,5 8 but that warning did not specify the rules and stat-
utes under which sanctions may be issued and did not explain the range and
consequence of the possible sanctions. 59
The court of appeals has been deferential with some litigants, as illustrated
by Mills v. Criminal District Court.60 In Mills, the court, per Judge Jolly,
reversed a district court dismissal of a pro se section 198361 complaint, and
held that the complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice. 62
The plaintiff had made conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, but the court
of appeals held that he should have the chance to re-file with proper factual
allegations.63 The court notified the prisoner that if he simply re-filed, with-
out giving additional facts, he might subject himself to rule 11 sanctions.64
In another case on the same day and involving the same litigant, the court
issued to Mr. Mills a similar decision with similar warnings.65 It is doubtful,
however, from a reading of the decisions that the litigant can understand the
warnings, that, for example, he can understand the difference between con-
clusory and nonconclusory allegations.
In other cases, however, neither the court of appeals nor the district court
appear to have given a pro se litigant any notice at all of the possibility of
sanctions, and yet the court of appeals has imposed sanctions. 66 Moreover,
the court of appeals has not been concerned with notice where a litigant is
represented by counsel.67 The best example of the latter is the court's impo-
sition of attorney's fees upon the city of Garland in News-Texan, Inc., de-
spite the fact that the district court itself refused to enter such a sanction.68
Perhaps the clearest examples of an inherent power model are not the
cases imposing sanctions without notice, but the development by the court of
new remedies against unwanted litigants. For example, in some cases of
sanctions imposed upon a prisoner, prison officials have been ordered to
56. Id.
57. Id. at 233.
58. Lay v. Butler, No. 86-3587, slip op. at 2 (5th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987) (per curiam):
"[R]ules and statutes authorizing sanction for frivolous and unmeritorious actions in the fed-
eral courts will be brought to bear on this unjustified litigiousness if it does not cease
promptly."
59. No. 86-3587 (Dec. 31, 1987).
60. 837 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1988).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
62. 837 F.2d at 679-80.
63. Id.
64. Id. n.2.
65. Mills v. Vinh, No. 87-2873, slip op. at 4 n.2 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1988) (per curiam).
66. See, e.g., Simmons v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1988); Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835
F,2d 124 (5th Cir. 1988). In these cases, the court impliedly held that the district court's
finding of frivolousness provided ample warning.
67. See, e.g., Coane v. West Houston Medical Center, No. 87-2717, slip op. (5th Cir. Nov.
2, 1987); News-Texan, Inc. v. Garland, 814 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. 814 F.2d at 221.
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withdraw moneys from prisoners' trust accounts. 69 In other cases, prisoners
have been warned that the courthouse doors will be shut;70 and those doors
have been shut. 71 In Lay v. Anderson,72 for example, the court ordered that
Lay may not appeal in forma pauperis until he pays $105 in costs, unless the
district court certifies that the appeal is in good faith. 73 In Gill v. Texas,74
the court ordered the clerk not to accept any additional filings in an ap-
peal.75 The court of appeals has not relied upon any rule or statute for these
sanctions, but has instead used its inherent power as a court.
Using its inherent power, the court of appeals has opted not to publish
several dozen decisions imposing sanctions. 76 The court is sanctioning many
litigants without letting the public know what it is doing. At times the sanc-
tioning decision is published, but the prior notice or warning is neither pub-
lished nor attached as an appendix. Regardless of whether nonpublication is
within the court's inherent powers, the court of appeals should not, end can-
not long, avoid public scrutiny of its imposition of sanctions. It should pub-
lish these decisions. 77
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Sanctions should be imposed for abusive conduct; I do not mean to sug-
gest to the contrary. The perception in this country78 and in others7 9 is that
abusive conduct is increasing and that appropriate remedies must be forth-
coming. In this country, it is clear that the courts are resorting to their
inherent power to develop new and appropriate remedies. 80 And I do not
mean to suggest that the courts are without power.
But what I do suggest is that the imposition of a sanction often is a serious
deprivation of property and liberty. For litigant and counsel alike, it might
be a loss of money or of reputation. Legislatures should participate in decid-
ing the general rules that govern the kind of sanctions imposed and the
methods by which they are imposed upon litigants and counsel; and until
legislatures act, courts should employ due process principles in developing
69. See, e.g., Simmons v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988); Gabel v. Lynaugh,
835 F.2d 124, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1988).
70. See Patterson v. Patterson, 808 F.2d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 1986).
71. See Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1986); Lonsdale v. Cagle, No. 86-
1592, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 1987).
72. 837 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988).
73. Id. at 232.
74. Gill v. Texas, No. 86-2834, slip op. (Sth.Cir. Dec. 22, 1987).
75. Id., slip op. at 15.
76. See FIFrH CIR. R. 47.5.1 ("opinions that have no precedential value and merely de-
cide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law").
77. For a synopsis of a number of these opinions, see the attached Appendix.
78. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988).
79. See Goldstein, Reflections on the Possibilities and Problems of Accelerating the Civil
Litigation Process, 7 TEL Aviv U. STUDIES IN LAW 50 (1985-86).
80. See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D.




sanctions. Due process principles are principles of fundamental fairness;
they are principles of long acceptance and wide acceptability.
I would suggest the following modifications of practice in the Fifth Circuit
to accord with due process principles.
A. Aggrieved Party's Role
An aggrieved party should in writing and with precision inform the other
party of its asserted violation of a statute or rule within ten days of the as-
serted violation. If the violation is not cured within ten days after notice, the
aggrieved party should move for a remedy, including a sanction, within an-
other ten days. Failure to move for a remedy within this last ten-day period
would waive sanctions.
B. District Court's Role
A district court should hold a hearing on the request for sanctions. In the
case of complaints against lawyers, such defenses as inadvertence, confusion,
and the need for expedition should be allowed despite the shift from a sub-
jective to an objective standard under rule 11. In the case of complaints
against nonlawyers under other provisions, additional defenses, such as lack
of knowledge and lack of competence, should be allowed. Following the
hearing the court should issue detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
In addition, everyone (and if not everyone, then at least pro se litigants)
should get one free bite. The one free bite is the first notice, as imprecise as
that notice might be. One free bite or not, however, a district court should
give notice with precision to a sanctioned party or attorney whether an ap-
peal or other finding may provoke further sanctions and what the range of
penalties might be under such sanctions.
C. Appellate Court's Role
The court of appeals' review should follow the three-part structure of
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co. 81 Moreover, the court should fully
explicate why the clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards are or
are not satisfied. If the court believes that the appeal is sanctionable, it
should then remand for a determination of whether the appellant had re-
ceived precise notice of the frivolousness of an appeal, whether the appellant
understood the notice, and what penalty is appropriate within the range pre-
viously indicated by the district court.
A due process model would fairly and accurately distinguish sanctionable
conduct from nonsanctionable conduct. Moreover, such a fair and adequate
process might well deter some of the satellite sanctions litigation that is un-
warranted. In short, if the court of appeals continues to rely upon its inher-
81. 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987). For additional discussion of Robinson's structure for
review, see supra text accompanying note 42.
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ent power, it should temper the exercise of that power with due process
fairness.
This is the fiftieth year of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules
were inspired by jurists and lawyers who wanted to open access to the fed-
eral courts in order to build confidence in the system of justice. By and
large, these jurists and lawyers adopted principles and rules that modeled
fairness. It would be an inapt celebration of the rules for the court of appeals
to abandon the premise and promise of the rules by using its inherent power
to limit access to the courts.
FIFTH CIRCUIT SANCTIONS
APPENDIX
1. Johnson v. University of Houston, No. 85-2812 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 1987)
(per curiam) (panel of Judges Clark, Garwood, and Hill) (sanction of
$500 against pro se appellant for frivolous appeal).
2. United States v. Wooster, No. 86-2292 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Politz, Williams, and Jones) (sanction of
$1,500 under rule 38).
3. Johnson v. Stephens Buick-Opel, Inc., No. 86-1547 (5th Cir. Mar. 9,
1987) (per curiam) (panel of Judges Rubin, Randall, and Higginbot-
ham) (sanction of attorney's fees, costs and expenses assessed "jointly
and severally" against appellant party and counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and rule 38).
4. Jackson v. Strauss Systems, Inc., No. 86-3671 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1987)
(Garwood, J., opinion) (Judges Clark and Hill also on panel) (sanction
of attorney's fees and costs assessed against counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1912 & 1927, rule 11 and rule 38).
5. Hardin v. McMaster, No. 86-1914 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 1987) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Politz, Williams, and Jones) (warning of possible sanc-
tions for filing of further frivolous appeals).
6. Anderson v. Baylor Medical Center, No. 86-1580 (5th Cir. Apr. 8,
1987) (Higginbotham, J., opinion) (Judges Rubin and Randall also on
panel) (affirming district court sanction of $700 under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988; assessment of double costs of appeal against counsel under rule
38).
7. Chitta v. Nueces County, No. 86-2856 (5th Cir. Apr. 10, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Clark, Politz, and Higginbotham) (refusing to
impose sanctions against pro se appellant).
8. Lonsdale v. Cagle, No. 86-1592 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 1987) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Clark, Garwood, and Hill) (sanctions of $2,000 as-
sessed against each of two appellants plus double costs of appeal and
prohibition of any tax-related appeals until sanctions paid and prior
judgments satisfied).
9. Benoit v. City Police Dep't, No. 87-403 (5th Cir. July 24, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Politz, Johnson, and Higginbotham) (admon-
ishing counsel, but declining to impose sanctions for frivolous appeal).
10. Lyons v. Town of Chatham, No. 86-4844 (5th Cir. Aug. 14, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Gee, Rubin, and Hill) (affirming district court
sanctions imposed under rule 11; assessing double costs of appeal under
rule 38).
11. Butler v. Abilene Veterinary Clinic, No. 87-1389 (5th Cir. Sept. 2,
1987) (per curiam) (panel of Judges Williams, Jolly, and Higginbot-
ham) (assessing double costs for frivolous appeal).
12. McDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 87-3240 (5th Cir. Sept. 11,
1987) (Reavley, J., opinion) (Judges Randall and Jolly also on panel)
(affirming district court sanctions under rule 11; assessing double costs
of appeal under rule 38).
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13. Evans v. Hathaway, No. 87-4517 (5th Cir. Oct. 2, 1987) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Politz, Johnson, and Higginbotham) (assessing double
costs of appeals against pro se appellant under rule 38; warning of fur-
ther sanctions if frivolous appeals continue).
14. Hickson v. Crawford, No. 87-2874 (5th Cir. Oct. 22, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (assessment of $10
in costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to be taken from prisoner's trust fund).
15. Nichols v. Wright, No. 87-1436 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 1987) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (assessing double costs and
$1,000 ($250 to be paid to each of four appellees) under rule 38).
16. Hardin v. United States, No. 87-1571 (5th Cir. Oct. 30, 1987) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (sanction of
double costs).
17. Coane v. West Houston Medical Center, No. 87-2717 (5th Cir. Nov. 2,
1987) (Reavley, J., opinion) (Judges Garwood and Jolly also on panel)
(affirming district court's denial of rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff-
appellant).
18. Gill v. Texas, No. 86-2834 (5th Cir. Dec. 22, 1987) (Garwood, J., opin-
ion) (Judges Gee and Jones also on panel) (assessing costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees for frivolous appeal and unreasonable and vexatious
multiplying of proceedings; prohibiting further motions in matter in-
cluding motions or rehearing).
19. Lay v. Butler, No. 86-3587 (5th Cir. Dec. 31, 1987) (per curiam) (panel
of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (warning of sanctions for future
frivolous actions).
20. Easley v. Speers, No. 87-6076 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (warning of possible sanc-
tions if litigation continues).
21. Mills v. Vinn, No. 87-2873 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 1988) (per curiam) (panel
of Judges Reavley, King, and Jolly) (reversing rule 11 sanction of $25,
but warning of possible sanctions for future "useless motions and civil
claims").
22. Johnson v. Moore, No. 87-2810 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Clark, Williams, and Davis) (warning of possible fu-
ture sanctions).
23. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, No. 87-1796 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 1988) (Gar-
wood, J., opinion) (Judges Gee and Jones also on panel) (declining to
impose rule 38 sanctions because appeal not frivolous, but assesesing
ordinary costs against appellant and losing party).
24. Lemons v. Myers, No. 87-2689 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (warning of possible mone-
tary sanctions or revocation of pauper status for future frivolous
appeals).
25. Stephenson & Thompson, P.C. v. Dayton Indep. School Dist., No. 87-
2756 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 1988) (per curiam) (panel of Circuit Judges
Rubin and Politz and District Judge Lee) (affirming district court's as-
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sessment of rule 11 sanctions; assessing double costs of appeal under
rule 38).
26. Hot Boudin Co. v. Harrison Price Co., No. 87-3753 (5th Cir. Mar. 8,
1988) (per curiam) (panel of Judges Clark, Williams, and Davis) (de-
clining to assess sanctions despite prior warning to appellant).
27. Jones v. Jones, No. 87-6150 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 1988) (per curiam) (panel
of Judges Clark, Williams, and Davis) (declining to assess sanctions
because appellant was pro se prisoner).
28. Bush v. United States, No. 86-6168 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Gee, Garwood, and Jones) (warning of finan-
cial sanctions if appellant continues to pursue case).
29. Taylor v. Bunge Corp., No. 87-3768 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Reavley, King, and Jolly) (affirming district
court's sanctions of attorney's fees and costs under rule 11; assessing
sanction of attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
30. Chandler v. Brister, No. 88-1134 (5th Cir. June 1, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Clark, Williams, and Davis) (warning of rule 11 and
rule 38 sanctions if appellant continues "to pursue groundless federal
claims"; declining to assess sanctions upon pro se appellant).
31. Thomas v. Woods, No. 88-2227 (5th Cir. June 1, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Clark, Williams, and Davis) (warning against further frivo-
lous suits and appeals).
32. Thomas v. Riley, No. 88-2431 (5th Cir. June 29, 1988) (Politz, J., opin-
ion) (Judges Johnson and Higginbotham also on panel) (affirming rule
11 sanctions imposed by district court; holding that no warning neces-
sary before imposing sanctions in case because of large number of frivo-
lous filings of same type) ("In such a setting . . . warning has no
meaning and is not a requisite to the imposition of sanctions.")
33. Corbit v. Clade, No. 88-1458 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Gee, Rubin, and Politz) (consolidating and dismissing
four cases brought by plaintiff; warning of rule 38 sanctions if plaintiff
continues to prosecute suits).
34. United States v. Landes, No. 87-5619 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Reavley, Johnson, and Jones) (warning of rule
11 and rule 38 sanctions if appellant continues to press rejected theory
of law).
35. Cargill, Inc. v. M/V Bedford, No. 87-3907 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1988)
(Rubin, J., opinion) (Judges Garwood and Davis also on panel) (rule
38 sanction of attorney fees and costs for frivolous portion of appeal).
36. Williams v. Lynaugh, No. 88-1469 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Williams, Garwood, and Higginbotham) (warning of
rule 38 sanctions fur future appeals and suits).
37. Warren v. Bergeron, No. 88-4033 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Gee, Williams, and Higginbotham) (assessing sanction
of $500 against counsel under rule 39 and § 1927 for appealing magis-
trate's order "to comply with existing rules of courtroom decorum").
38. Hamilton v. Stovall, No. 87-6152 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 1988) (per curiam)
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(panel of Judges Politz, King, and Smith) (assessing double costs under
rule 38).
39. United States v. Ortloff, No. 88-1645 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges King, Garwood, and Smith) (warning of pos-
sible future sanctions under rule 11 and rule 38).
40. Gulf Water Benefaction Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, No. 87-6059 (5th
Cir. Nov. 2, 1988) (Garwood, J., opinion) (Judges Rubin and Davis
also on panel) (affirming dismissal of suit under rule 41(b) as within
"court's inherent powers"; assessing sanction of costs, expenses, and
attorney fees against appellant under rule 38; holding appellant's attor-
ney jointly and severally liable for sanctions under § 1927 for "malice,
stupidity, or gross negligence").
41. Minton v. Key Serve Group, No. 88-2936 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Johnson, Davis, and Jones) (warning of future
rule 11 and rule 38 sanctions).
42. Benson v. Ally, No. 88-4672 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Johnson and Jones) (warning of future rule 11 and
rule 38 sanctions).
43. Szumigal v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88-4313 (5th Cir. Nov. 4,
1988) (per curiam) (panel of Judges Rubin, Garwood, and Davis) (ad-
monishing counsel, but declining to assess sanctions).
44. Fagone v. Parish of W. Carroll, No. 88-4139 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 1988)
(Rubin, J., opinion) (Judges Garwood and Davis also on panel) (assess-
ing sanction of double costs for "unrelenting desire to pursue a claim
without arguable merit").
45. Corbit v. Crow, No. 88-1451 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 1988) (per curiam)
(panel of Judges Rubin, Garwood, and Davis) (dismissing six appeals
and noting prior warning of future sanctions (see item 33 above); vacat-
ing authorization to proceed in forma pauperis and directing payment
of appellate costs; imposing filing restraint against new appeals until
sanctions paid and prior judgments satisfied).
46. Pringle v. Bournias, No. 87-1834 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 1988) (Smith, J.,
opinion) (Judges Politz and King also on panel) (affirming district
court's rule 16(f) sanctions of $250 and attorney's fees assessed against
one defendant; remanding rule 11 sanctions totallying $40,000 as-
sessed, jointly and severally, against eight defendants and two attorneys
(two defendants and one attorney did not appeal; the appealing attor-
ney was also assessed the rule 16(f) sanctions, but appealed only the
rule 11 sanctions)). The panel found rule 11 sanctions were appropri-
ate, but remanded "for a statement of reasons justifying the large
amount of sanctions imposed." The panel then imposed a sanction of
attorney fees under rule 38 and § 1927 against appellants.
47. Waters v. Commissioner, No. 88-4434 (5th Cir. Nov. 22, 1988) (per
curiam) (panel of Judges Politz, King, and Smith) (affirming sanction
of $5,000 assessed by Tax Court under Internal Revenue Code § 6673
for frivolous arguments; assessing sanction of $1,500 under rule 38 and
Internal Revenue Code § 7482(c)(4) for frivolous appeal).
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48. Adams, Kleemier, Hagan, Hannah & Fouts v. Namr, No. 88-3379 (5th
Cir. Nov. 28, 1988) (Gee, J., opinion) (Judges Williams and Higginbot-
ham also on panel) (assessing sanction of attorney fees and double costs
under rule 38 against defendant-appellant).
49. United Mkts. Int'l, Inc. v. O'Baid, No. 88-2721 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 1988)
(per curiam) (panel of Judges Rubin, Reavley, and Jones) (warning of
future rule 38 and § 1927 sanctions).
50. Landry v. McClanahan, No. 88-4599 (5th Cir. Dec. 7, 1988) (order of
Rubin, J.) (denying "garbled and confusing" motion related to appeal
of rule 11 sanctions; warning that appellant should consider voluntarily
dismissing appeal to avoid rule 38 sanctions).
51. Thomas v. Wilson, No. 88-2709 (5th Cir. Dec. 23, 1988) (Davis, J.,
opinion) (Judges Rubin and Garwood also on panel) (affirming district
court sanction of $50; warning of future rule 38 sanctions; declining to
impose sanctions "[t]o avoid heaping coals on Thomas' head.")

